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ABSTRACT
We  study  CEO  turnover  –  both  internal  (board  driven)  and  external  (through  takeover  and
bankruptcy) – from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies.  Annual CEO turnover is
higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods.  Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to
2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years.  In the more recent period since
1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years.
Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance – performance
relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the
overall stock market.  Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to
performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous
year.  External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over
the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings
for various issues in corporate governance.   
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I.  Introduction 
In the last several years, corporate governance in the United States has come under great 
scrutiny, if not attack.  The corporate governance scandals early in this decade led to the 
Sarbanes Oxley legislation.  Since the legislation, the criticism of corporate governance has 
continued.  CEOs are routinely criticized for being overpaid.  Boards of directors are routinely 
criticized as cronies of those overpaid CEOs.  Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) document the 
increase in CEO pay since the 1970s.  Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Bebchuk and Grinstein 
(2005) document a substantial increase in CEO pay accelerated after 1995.  All three papers 
criticize boards of directors for the increases in CEO pay and for not doing a good job 
monitoring the pay practices and CEOs.   
While a great deal of work has focused on changes in CEO pay, recent changes in CEO 
turnover and board behavior have received little attention.  Earlier work and casual empiricism 
suggest that the CEO’s job has become riskier over time.  Khurana (2003) reports that CEO 
turnover increased in the 1990s relative to the 1970s and 1980s.  Murphy and Zabonjik (2004) 
and Jensen et al. (2004) also report that turnover has increased in the 1990s, although the 
magnitude they report is quite small – from 10% per year in the 1970s and 1980s to 11% in the 
1990s.  The samples in these papers do not go beyond the year 2000 so they are unable to 
consider the period in which corporate governance and CEO performance and pay have been 
subject to intense scrutiny.  
In this paper, we study CEO turnover from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. 
companies.  We consider turnover that occurs through takeover and bankruptcy as well as 
turnover in ongoing companies.  When takeovers and bankruptcies are taken into consideration, 
the job of CEO in large U.S. companies appears more precarious than before, particularly after   2 
1997.  Annual CEO turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of 
less than seven years.  In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 
16.5%, implying an average CEO turnover of just over six years.  Internal or board driven 
turnover also rises substantially, increasing from 10.3% in the first part of the sample to 12.8% in 
the latter part of the sample.  Looked at another way, only 35% of CEOs in place in 1992 
remained CEO in 1997, while only 24% of CEOs in place in 1998 remained CEO in 2003.  
We then look at how turnover varies with firm performance.  Previous work suggests a 
modest relation between internal (board initiated) turnover and firm performance.  (See Murphy 
(1999) and Jensen et al. (2004)).  We find a stronger and significant relation between internal 
turnover and firm performance.  Interestingly, internal turnover is related to three different 
components of total firm performance.  I.e., turnover is sensitive to the performance of the firm 
relative to the industry, the performance of the industry relative to the stock market, and the 
performance of the overall stock market.
1  The sensitivity to a one standard deviation difference 
in each of these measures is economically meaningful.  
Further, internal turnover after 1997 is more strongly related to all three measures of 
performance.  In fact, the sensitivity to performance appears to be greater than that in any of the 
periods between 1970 and 1995 studied in Murphy (1999).  Ironically, it appears that during the 
period in which boards have been heavily criticized, boards have become increasingly sensitive 
to firm performance and have acted more quickly and decisively.   
External turnover – turnover primarily related to acquisitions – is not significantly related 
to any of the stock performance measures, nor do we observe any difference between the two 
sub-periods as we do for internal turnover. 
Our results suggest a number of implications.   
                                                            
1 Jenter and Kanaan (2006) obtain similar results which we discuss below.   3 
First, the results suggest an evolving role for boards.  In a sample from the 1980s, Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) find that internal turnover is related to industry-adjusted performance 
while external turnover from hostile takeovers is related to industry performance.  They interpret 
this as indicating boards respond well to poor performance relative to the industry, but do not 
respond well to poor industry performance.  The external takeover market becomes active in 
reaction to poor industry performance and a need for restructuring. 
Our results suggest that boards now respond not only to poor performance relative to the 
industry, but also to poor industry performance and to poor market performance.  To the extent 
that internal turnover has increased, boards also appear to monitor more frequently or 
aggressively.  One interpretation of these results is that boards – possibly encouraged by large 
shareholders – perform both the role they performed in the 1980s and the role that hostile 
takeovers played then.   
It is worth repeating that the results indicate that boards do not index CEO turnover to the 
industry or the market.  This is noteworthy in light of criticisms of boards for not indexing CEO 
pay to the industry or the market.  Bebchuk and Fried (2003) interpret the lack of indexing of pay 
as a failure of governance.  Our results on turnover in conjunction with those in Morck et al. 
(1989) for the earlier period provide an alternative explanation.  When an industry or the overall 
economy performs poorly, it is sometimes efficient for the board to bring on a new CEO to 
respond to the new industry or market conditions. 
Second, the results indicate that the CEO job is more precarious than has been previously 
recognized.  When external takeovers are included, the average tenure of a CEO has declined to 
as little as six years for the recent 1998 to 2005 period.  The recent tenures are substantially 
shorter than those reported in previous work for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.  For individual   4 
CEOs, the shorter expected tenure likely offsets some of the benefit of the increase in CEO pay 
over this period.   
Third, the shorter expected CEO tenures and sensitivity of those tenures to stock 
performance have implications for the measurement of CEO pay.  The shorter expected tenures 
suggest that the estimates of CEO pay used in most compensation studies are overstated.  Most 
such studies use Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp data.  ExecuComp estimates the value of 
options grants using Black-Scholes.  While option grants typically have a ten-year life, 
ExecuComp uses a seven-year life because “executives rarely wait until the expiration date to 
exercise their options.”  This adjustment assumes that CEOs will remain with the company for at 
least seven years.  If a CEO has an expected initial tenure of six years, the ExecuComp 
assumption will tend to overstate the value of option grants every year of the CEO’s tenure with 
the overstatement increasing each year.
2  ExecuComp also values restricted stock grants as fully 
vested when, in fact, they usually vest over a period of time.  This also will tend to overstate 
executive compensation. 
The sensitivity of turnover to performance implies that the vesting and effective life of 
stock options are not independent of performance.  The options of CEOs of companies that 
perform poorly will both have a shorter effective life and will be worth less.  The Black-Scholes 
methodology does not take these correlations into account.  This, in turn, implies that a proper 
valuation of stock options – e.g., using a binomial tree approach – would incorporate these 
correlations. 
                                                            
2 This assumes that CEOs forfeit unvested options and / or must exercise vested options when they leave the 
company.  Yermack (2006) finds that this tends to be the default policy and companies deviate from those policies 
in 16% of the internal turnovers he studies.  We discuss this in more detail later in the paper.   5 
Finally, shorter CEO tenures, the greater sensitivity to stock performance, as well as 
higher CEO pay may have created a greater incentive for CEOs to engage in earnings 
management or manipulation.  
This paper was written contemporaneously with Jenter and Kanaan (2005) who study 
related issues in a sample of CEO turnover from 1993 to 2001.  They focus on forced CEO 
turnover, rather than all CEO turnover.  Forced turnovers represent somewhere between 15% and 
25% of total internal turnovers.  As we do for forced and unforced turnover, they find that forced 
CEO turnover is significantly related to industry-adjusted, industry, and market returns.  They 
focus most of their paper on verifying this effect for forced turnover and explaining why boards 
might behave this way.  They also study a larger sample of firms, but over a shorter time period.  
Unlike us, they do not focus on the level of total turnover, the annual variation in that turnover, 
and do not consider external turnovers.  Given their shorter sample, they also do not consider 
how turnover behavior changes from the early to later part of the sample.  
Our paper also is related to that of Mikkelson and Partch (1997) who compare complete 
management turnover in US companies in two five-year periods – the active takeover market of 
1984 - 1988 and the less active market of 1989-1993.  In the active takeover period, they find 
that 39% of firms experience CEO turnover and 23% of firms experience complete management 
turnover; in the less active period, 34% of firms experience CEO turnover while 16% of firms 
experience complete management turnover.  They find that the decline in turnover frequency is 
more pronounced among poorly performing firms.  They argue that the activity of the external 
takeover market affects the “intensity of management discipline.”  Our results suggest that the 
intensity of management discipline has increased substantially since the end of their sample 
period, and likely exceeds the intensity of the active takeover period.   6 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes our sample.  Section III presents the 
results for turnover levels.  Section IV presents the turnover-performance regressions.  Section V 
summarizes and discusses the implications of these results.  
 
II.  Sample and Data 
The sample of firms includes all Fortune 500 firms with data on both the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes and Compustat files (research and current files).  The 
sample runs from fiscal-year end 1991 to fiscal-year-end 2005.  We construct the sample using 
the annual Fortune 500 lists from 1992 to 2006.  Each year, Fortune ranks firms based on sales at 
fiscal-year end and publishes the list in an April or May issue of the following year.  For 
example, fiscal-year end 1991 rankings are published in an April or May 1992 issue.  Table 1 
provides summary statistics for the sample firms.  Not surprisingly, the sample firms are large 
with mean (median) sales of $7.5 billion ($3.9 billion).  The number of observations increases 
substantially in 1994 because Fortune changed its criteria for inclusion, broadening the number 
of firms that could be included in the Fortune 500. 
We follow the sample firms from the first year they appear on a Fortune list until the end 
of the sample period or until the firm exits the sample because of a merger, acquisition or 
delisting from a major stock exchange.  We identify CEO turnovers using the Fortune 500 and 
Fortune 1000 lists, 10-K filings, proxy statements, Dun and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar 
Directory, the Wall Street Journal and Lexis/Nexis business news searches.   
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III.  Turnover Levels 
  Turnover in a given fiscal year, T, means that the CEO in the spring of that year is no 
longer the CEO by the following spring.  We measure turnover, therefore in the years 1992 to 
2005.  We consider two types of turnover.  Standard or internal turnover is turnover that is 
associated with a company’s board of directors.  For standard turnover, a company remains 
publicly-listed over the course of the year, but the CEO in the spring is no longer the CEO the 
following spring.   This is the turnover that is generally measured in studies of turnover.  Non-
standard or external turnover is turnover due to a merger or bankruptcy / delisting.  We also 
consider the CEO to have been turned over if his or her company is taken over by another 
company and he or she is not CEO of the combined company.  We view this as an instance of 
turnover because in many mergers the former CEO leaves the combined company.  In those 
instances in which the CEO former remains, the former CEO generally experiences a reduction 
in pay and power.  Total turnover is the sum of internal and external turnover.   
Table 2 presents the level of CEO turnover by year.   Figure 1 presents this information 
graphically.  There are three noteworthy patterns.  First, total turnover levels are substantially 
higher than those typically reported.   Overall turnover is 14.9% over the entire sample period 
implying an average CEO tenure of 6.7 years.   This is substantially higher than that reported in 
Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) and Murphy and Zabonjik (2004) who study a different 
sample of large firms (from the Forbes lists) over three decades from 1970 to 2000.  They report 
turnover of 10.2% in the 1970s, 10.0% in the 1980s, and 11.3% in the 1990s.  All of these 
measures, however, are for standard or internal turnover.  For our sample period of 1992 to 2005, 
we obtain a standard turnover of 11.8%, similar to their results for the 1990s.  At 11.8%, the   8 
estimated average CEO tenure is 8.5 years, roughly two years greater than the actual average 
tenure (that includes external takeover). 
The second noteworthy pattern in table 2 is the time series variation in the levels of both 
total and internal turnover.  Total turnover is as low as 6.4% in 2003 (and only 8.6% in 1994), 
and as high as 25.0% in 2000 (and 19.8% in 1999).   
Third, turnover increased significantly in the latter part of the sample.  In the earlier 
period from 1992 to 1997, CEO turnover is 12.7% per year implying an average tenure of 7.9 
years.  In the more recent period from 1998 to 2005, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, 
implying an average CEO turnover of 6.1 years.  Internal or board driven turnover also rises 
substantially, increasing from 10.3% in the first part of the sample to 12.8% in the latter part of 
the sample.  The increase in turnover is driven by very high levels of turnover from 1998 to 2002 
and in 2005. 
It is natural to divide the sample period into pre-1998 and post-1997 because this break 
roughly coincides with the large increase in CEO pay described in Bebchuk and Grinstein 
(2005).
3  The period in which CEO pay increased substantially coincides with a period in which 
CEO tenure decreases substantially.  It is worth adding that the increased level of turnover began 
well before 2002 (when the Enron and Worldcom scandals became apparent and Sarbanes-Oxley 
was passed). 
Table 3 presents the turnover data in a different way.  We compare the fraction of the 
CEOs in 1992 who are no longer CEOs in 1997 to the fraction of CEOs who are CEOs in 1998 
and no longer CEOs in 2003.  The table shows that 65% of CEOs in 1992 were no longer CEOs 
                                                            
3 We used the same 1997-1998 breakpoint in the previous version of the paper.  Because that version that did not 
include 2005 turnover, the breakpoint represented roughly half of the sample.   9 
in 1997, while over 76% of CEOs in 1998 were no longer CEOs by 2003.   Again, this result 
suggests that the job of CEO has become increasingly precarious over the sample period.   
The turnover also is substantially greater than that measured by Mikkelsen and Partch 
(1997) over two earlier five year periods.  In the active takeover period from 1983 to 1988, they 
find that 39% of firms experience CEO turnover (and 23% of firms experience complete 
management turnover); in the less active period from 1989 to 1993, 34% of firms experience 
CEO turnover (while 16% of firms experience complete management turnover).  Unfortunately, 
these results are not directly comparable because the sample in Mikkelsen and Partch consists of 
smaller firms. 
 
IV.  The Relation of Turnover and Performance 
A.   Internal Turnover 
We estimate probit regressions to examine the likelihood of internal CEO turnover. In all 
of the probit regressions, the dependent variable is equal to one if a CEO turns over and zero 
otherwise.  The tables report the marginal changes in the probability of internal CEO turnover, 
implied by the probit coefficient estimates that result from a unit change in the explanatory 
variables.  For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability 
associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1.  These marginal sensitivities, labeled "DProb," 
are economically equivalent to coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares estimation.  In 
the discussion below, we focus on the significance of these marginal effects. 
In all of the probit regressions, three proxies are used to measure stock market 
performance.  First, we measure market performance using the annual return on the S&P 500 
index.  Second, relative industry performance is measured at the two-digit SIC code level and   10 
equals the difference between the return on the median firm in the industry and the return on the 
S&P 500 index.  Third, relative firm performance is measured as the industry-adjusted firm stock 
return, which is equal to the firm stock return minus the return for the median firm in the same 
two-digit SIC code.  All returns are measured at calendar year-end. 
In table 4, we report the results for two sets of probit regressions.  In the first set of 
regressions, we include measures of stock market performance and an indicator variable equal to 
one if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 (CEO age dummy).  In the second set of 
regressions, we add the change in ROA as a measure of operating performance.  For the first set 
of regressions, we report the results for the full sample period and two sub-periods: 1992 to 1997 
and 1998 to 2005.  For the second set of regressions, we report the results for the period 1992 to 
2004 and two sub-periods: 1992 to 1997 and 1998 to 2004 (because of data availability for 
change in ROA). 
Table 4 shows that all three components of stock performance are significantly related to 
internal CEO turnover.   
First, turnover increases with poor industry-adjusted performance over the entire sample 
period and, particularly, in the latter 1998 to 2005 period.   For the 1998 to 2005 subperiod, a 
one-standard deviation (38%) decline in a firm’s industry adjusted stock return is associated with 
an increase of 3.5% in the likelihood of CEO turnover.  This sensitivity appears to be greater 
than the sensitivities reported in Murphy (1999) for various subperiods between 1970 and 1995.  
This is particularly interesting given that Murphy (1999) finds that turnover is not related to 
industry-adjusted performance between 1990 and 1995. 
Second, CEO turnover is also related to poor industry performance.  Again, the relation 
appears to be driven by the second subperiod.  For the 1998 to 2005 subperiod, a one-standard   11 
deviation (22.5%) decline in industry performance is associated with a 2.1% increase in the 
likelihood of CEO turnover.   
Third, lower overall market performance, as measured by the return on the S&P 500 
index, is also associated with a higher likelihood of internal CEO turnover.  For the full sample 
period, a one-standard deviation (17%) decline in the S&P 500 index is associated with a 
significant increase of 2.2% in the probability of internal CEO turnover.  This relation is driven 
by the second subperiod.  There is no statistical relation between market performance and CEO 
turnover in the first sub-period (1992 to 1997).  In contrast, in the later period (1998 to 2005), a 
one-standard deviation (18%) decline in the S&P 500 index corresponds to an increase of 2.9% 
in the probability of CEO turnover.   
These results indicate that the relation between internal CEO turnover and overall stock 
market performance appears to have intensified after 1997.  All three sensitivities to stock 
performance – 3.5%, 2.1%, and 2.9%, respectively, for one standard deviation changes in 
industry-adjusted, industry, and market performance – are economically meaningful relative to 
average internal turnover of 12.83% from 1998 to 2005.   
The second set of regressions in table 4 includes the change in return on assets (ROA) in 
addition to the stock return variables.  The results are qualitatively unchanged.  The change in 
ROA is marginally significant during the full sample period from 1992 to 2004 but it is not 
statistically significant in the sub-period regressions.  While the estimate is statistically 
significant, a one standard deviation increase in the change in ROA is associated with only a 0.7 
percent increase in the likelihood of CEO turnover.   
In table 5, we add one year of lagged performance variables to the regressions.  The first 
set of regressions excludes the change in ROA while the second set includes the change in ROA.    12 
Consistent with the results in table 4, table 5 suggests that boards are sensitive to all three types 
of stock performance over the entire sample period and increasingly sensitive to all three 
measures in the later period. 
For the entire period, internal CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to 
industry-adjusted and overall market stock performance in the current year.  Turnover also is 
significantly negatively related to industry-adjusted and industry performance stock performance 
in the previous year.  Strangely, turnover is significantly positively related to the lagged return 
on the S&P 500.  (One possible explanation is that CEOs choose to leave after a year in which 
the market has done well.) 
As in the previous results, the regressions in table 5 indicate that the turnover-
performance relations are driven by the later subperiod.  During the later subperiod, internal 
CEO turnover is significantly related to industry-adjusted and industry stock performance in the 
current year and previous year.  Turnover is negatively related to the overall market in the 
current year and positively related in the previous year. 
The coefficients in the first set of regressions imply that a one-standard deviation decline 
in the S&P 500 increases the likelihood of turnover by a total of 0.9% in the entire sample period 
and by 1.2% in the 1998 to 2005 subperiod (where we have added the current year and lagged 
year coefficients).  A one-standard deviation decline in the firms’ industry also increases the 
likelihood of turnover by a total of 1.3% over the entire sample period and by 1.9% in the 1998 
to 2005 subperiod.  Finally, a one-standard deviation decline in industry-adjusted performance 
increases the likelihood of turnover by 4.3% and 5.3%, respectively, over the entire sample 
period and in the 1998 to 2005 subperiod.  Again, the sensitivity to industry-adjusted   13 
performance for the 1998 to 2005 period appears to be greater than any of the sensitivities 
reported in Murphy (1999).  
In the earlier subperiod, 1992 to 1997, contemporaneous and lagged industry-adjusted 
performance are significantly negative while lagged market performance is marginally 
significantly positive.  The sum of the coefficients (lagged and contemporaneous) for each of the 
three stock performance measures is less negative in the earlier period than in the later period.    
The regressions that include lagged change in ROA indicate that boards are sensitive to 
changes in operating performance in the later subperiods.  However, a one standard deviation 
change in the change in ROA is associated with a smaller increase in CEO turnover than a one 
standard deviation change in the stock market performance.  The differences in responsiveness to 
stock performance over the two subperiods remain. 
Overall, the results in tables 4 and 5 suggest that since 1997, boards have been both more 
sensitive to poor performance and have responded more quickly to that poor performance.  It is 
also worth noting that the economic magnitudes of the effect are large.  For the 1998 to 2005 
period, the coefficients imply that a CEO whose firm performs one standard deviation better than 
the industry has a 5.3% lower likelihood of turnover while a CEO whose firm performs one 
standard deviation worse than the industry has a 5.3% increase in the likelihood of turnover.  
From a base turnover level of 12.8%, these imply likelihoods of 7.5% for the strong performer 
versus 18.1% for the poor performer.  These are economically meaningful differences with 7.5% 
implying a tenure of 13.3 years and 18.1% implying a tenure of 5.5 years. 
Table 6 repeats the table 5 probit regressions dividing the sample into two sets of firms:  
firms in the S&P500 index and all other Fortune 500 firms.  We do this for two reasons.  First, 
many papers on executive compensation and corporate governance use the ExecuComp data set   14 
that includes only firms in various S&P indices.  It is possible there is a selection bias in these 
firms.  Second, investors may be more likely to pay attention to firms in the S&P 500 index, and, 
if so, these firms would be more likely to be monitored by the press and institutional investors.  
Thus, the effect of stock market performance might be different for these firms (Bertrand and 
Mullanianathan, 2001).   
The coefficient patterns are qualitatively similar for the two sets of firms.  Turnover in 
both sets of firms is significantly related to industry-adjusted and market stock performance over 
the entire sample period.  As in the sample overall, the relations are stronger in the more recent 
1998 to 2005 period.   
 
B.  Internal Turnover and Governance 
Recent work has suggested that differences in corporate governance may have real 
effects.  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) find that differences in corporate governance are 
related to stock returns.  Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2005) find that those differences in corporate 
governance are related to acquisition behavior.   
In this section, we examine the relation between turnover, market and firm performance 
measures and governance.   To do so, we use the GIM index developed by Gompers et al. 
(2003).  They categorize 24 charter provisions, bylaw provisions, and other firm-level rules 
associated with corporate governance into five types: (1) Tactics for delaying hostile bidders, (2) 
voting rights, (3) director/officer protection, (4) other takeover defenses, and (5) state laws.  
Their overall index and the five component indices generally score one point for each provision 
that restricts shareholder rights or increases managerial power. Thus, a higher index score 
represents greater managerial power (weaker shareholder rights).     15 
We estimated turnover regressions that interact stock performance with the measure of 
governance.  We used both a continuous measure of the GIM index as well as a dummy variable 
if the firm’s GIM index was in the highest quintile.  To the extent that the GIM index measures 
poor governance, one would expect the interaction terms to have positive coefficients. 
Table 7 presents our results for regressions using the dummy variable for the highest 
GIM index quintile.  For the sample overall and for each sub-period, the sum of the coefficients 
on the interaction terms for current year and lagged stock returns are insignificant for all three 
types of stock performance.  In other words, governance does not appear to be related to turnover 
for the sum of the two coefficients.   
The only way in which the GIM index interaction is significant is that turnover is 
significantly more sensitive to poor lagged industry-adjusted performance for the high GIM 
index firms during the overall sample period and in the 1998 to 2005 subperiod.  The GIM index 
interaction for current year industry-adjusted performance is significantly positive in the 1998 to 
2005 period.  Again, in both the overall and 1998 to 2005 subperiods, the net effect of the 
interaction terms for the two years is to be insignificantly negatively related to industry-adjusted 
performance.   
Although not reported in a table, our results also are qualitatively similar when we 
interact stock performance with the continuous measure of the GIM index. 
Overall, then, we interpret these results as finding that the GIM measures of governance 
do not have an appreciable relation to or impact on CEO turnover.  Our results are consistent 
with a contemporaneous paper by Bhagat and Bolton (2006) who also fail to find a significant 
effect on turnover when they interact governance and performance. 
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C.  Forced Turnover 
Thus far, we have not distinguished between forced turnover and all other turnover.  
Jenter and Kanaan (2006) focus exclusively on forced turnover.  As we do for all turnover, they 
find that forced turnover is related to the three different measures of performance.  It is possible 
that our results are driven by the forced turnover in our sample.  To examine whether this is the 
case and whether performance is related differently to forced turnover and standard internal 
turnover, we estimate multinomial logit (MNL) regressions.  
We follow Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) in classifying turnover as forced.   (Jenter 
and Kanaan (2006) also use this classification scheme.)  Specifically, if an article indicates that 
the CEO was fired, forced, or left following a policy disagreement or some other equivalent, then 
turnover is defined as forced.  For the remaining announcements, succession is classified as 
forced when the CEO is under 60 and the first article reporting the announcement does not report 
the reason for the departure as involving death, poor health or the acceptance of another position 
elsewhere. Over the entire sample period, internal turnover is 11.79% per year.  Forced turnover 
is 1.87% while unforced turnover is 9.80%.
4  Identifiably forced turnover, therefore, is infrequent 
relative to all internal turnover. 
We present the regression results in table 8.  The dependent variable categories in the 
MNL estimations are no turnover, unforced turnover, or forced turnover.  The table reports the 
marginal effect of each regressor and the associated probability value (p-value) of the test that 
the marginal probability is equal to zero based on asymptotic standard errors.   
The probability of forced turnover is significantly negatively related to the three 
components of firm performance – firm performance relative to the industry, the industry relative 
                                                            
4 The sum does not add to 11.79% because 12 turnovers could not be classified as forced or unforced based on 
available information.   17 
to the market, and the overall market – in the current year and to industry-adjusted return in the 
previous year.  The probability of unforced turnover is significantly negatively related to firm 
performance relative to the industry and the overall market in the current year, and to industry 
return and industry-adjusted return in the previous year.    
Overall, then, both forced turnover and unforced turnover are sensitive to all three types 
of poor performance.  This suggests that many unforced turnovers are not voluntary.    
 
D.  External Turnover 
As discussed earlier, in addition to internal turnover, we examine external turnover.  
Recall, non-standard or external turnover is turnover due to a merger or bankruptcy / delisting.  
We consider the CEO to have been turned over in a merger if his or her company is taken over 
by another company and he or she is not CEO of the combined company.  We consider the CEO 
to have been turned over in a bankruptcy if he or she is no longer CEO of the bankrupt company.  
The incidence of external turnover is 3.1% per year over the sample period. 
Table 9 reports probit regressions of the probability of external turnover as a function of 
stock market performance and operating performance. As in tables 4 and 5, we report the results 
with and without the change in operating performance.  We do not include current year 
performance because firms are taken over or delisted in the current year. 
The results in table 9 show that external turnover is not related to any of the three 
measures of stock performance over the entire sample period when we exclude the change in 
operating performance.  When we include the change in operating performance, turnover is 
negatively related to industry performance relative to the market and positively related to the 
change in operating performance.  Even in this case, the marginal probabilities are economically   18 
small.  For example, a one standard deviation decline in industry performance over the sample 
period (1992 to 2004) increases the probability of an external turnover by 0.08%.   
The insignificant results for external turnover and performance suggest that, on average, 
takeovers during this period were not disciplinary in nature.   
 
V.  Summary and Implications 
  In this paper, we examine the extent of and determinants of internal and external CEO 
turnover for a sample of large U.S. companies from 1992 to 2005.  Total turnover, the sum of 
internal and external turnover, is about 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average CEO 
tenure of less than seven years.  In the more recent period from 1998 to 2005, total CEO turnover 
increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of approximately six years.   
  Internal CEO turnover that is associated with a company’s board of directors is 
significantly related to three components of firm performance – performance relative to the 
industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall 
market.  These relations intensify after 1997 in that from 1998 onward internal turnover is more 
strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year.  These results 
remain even after controlling for operating performance and governance measures. 
  We also examine the likelihood of forced turnover, unforced turnover and no turnover 
using MNL regressions.  Both forced turnover and unforced turnover are sensitive to all three 
types of poor performance.   
Finally, external turnover is not related to any of the three measures of performance – 
industry-adjusted, industry and market performance – over the entire sample period.  
We believe our results have a number of implications.     19 
First, the results suggest an evolving role for boards.  In a sample from the 1980s, Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) find that internal turnover is related to industry-adjusted performance 
while external turnover from hostile takeovers is related to industry performance.  They interpret 
this as indicating boards respond well to poor performance relative to the industry, but do not 
respond well to poor industry performance.  The external takeover market becomes active in 
reaction to poor industry performance and a need for restructuring. 
Our results suggest that boards now respond not only to poor performance relative to the 
industry, but also to poor industry and to poor market performance.  To the extent that internal 
turnover has increased, boards also appear to monitor more frequently or aggressively.  One 
interpretation of these results is that boards – possibly encouraged by large shareholders –
perform both the role they played in the 1980s and the role that hostile takeovers played then.   
It is worth repeating that the results indicate that boards do not index CEO turnover to the 
industry or the market.  This is noteworthy in light of criticisms of boards for not indexing CEO 
pay to the industry or the market.  Bebchuk and Fried (2003) interpret the lack of indexing of pay 
as a failure of governance.  Our results on turnover in conjunction with those in Morck et al. 
(1989) for the earlier period provide an alternative explanation.  When an industry or the overall 
economy performs poorly, it is sometimes efficient for the board to bring on a new CEO to 
respond to the new industry or market conditions. 
Second, the CEO job is more precarious than has been previously recognized.  When 
external takeovers are included, the average tenure of a CEO has declined to as little as six years 
in the most recent 1998 to 2005 period.  This is substantially shorter than the average tenures 
reported in previous work for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.     20 
The shorter expected tenure coincides with the well-documented increase in annual CEO 
pay over the same period.  For an individual CEO, therefore, the shorter tenure partially offsets 
the increase in pay.  For example, the annual pay of S&P 500 CEOs roughly doubled in real 
terms from the 1992 – 1997 period to the 1998 – 2004 period.  Our estimates indicate that the 
total pay of an individual CEO over his entire expected term increased by less than this because 
the expected tenure at the higher pay declined by roughly ¼ to 1/3.   
This calculation would be inaccurate if severance agreements around internal turnover 
and takeovers are both large and have increased over time.  If, instead, the severance agreements 
are small, then they do not have much of an effect on a CEOs total pay.   And if they have 
remained the same over time, then they increase pay by similar amounts in both periods.  
Yermack (2006) studies separation payments made when Fortune 500 CEOs leave their firms.  
While more than half of the CEOs in his sample receive compensation upon leaving, he 
concludes that the mean payments are “modest,” averaging less than one year’s compensation.  
He does not study whether these payments have changed over time.  Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack 
(2004) study benefits obtained by target company CEOs in acquisitions.  Excluding gains on the 
shares and options the CEOs already hold, Hartzell et al. find that the CEOs receive an average 
of roughly $3 million (and a median that appears to be roughly $1 million) in benefits.  They do 
not study whether these payments have changed over time.   
Overall, then, the severance payments in Yermack (2006) and Hartzell et al. (2004) do 
not seem large enough to alter the conclusion that the job of CEO has become riskier and that the 
shorter expected tenures of CEOs partially offset the increases in CEO pay. 
Third, the shorter expected CEO tenures and sensitivity of those tenures to stock 
performance have implications for the measurement of CEO pay.  The shorter expected tenures   21 
suggest that the estimates of CEO pay used in most compensation studies are overstated.  Most 
such studies use Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp data.  ExecuComp estimates the value of 
options grants using Black-Scholes.  While option grants typically have a ten-year life, 
ExecuComp uses a seven-year life because “executives rarely wait until the expiration date to 
exercise their options.”  This adjustment assumes that CEOs will remain with the company for at 
least seven years.  If a CEO has an expected initial tenure of six years, the ExecuComp 
assumption will tend to overstate the value of option grants every year of the CEO’s tenure with 
the overstatement increasing each year.  This assumes that CEOs forfeit unvested options and / 
or must exercise vested options when they leave the company.  For internal turnover, Yermack 
(2006) finds that this tends to be the default policy for most companies and companies deviate 
from those policies in only 16% of the internal turnovers he studies.  The reasonableness of the 
assumption is less clear and less well-documented in the (less frequent) instances of external 
takeovers.   
The sensitivity of turnover to performance implies that both the vesting and life of stock 
options are not independent of performance.  The options of CEOs of companies that perform 
poorly will both have a shorter effective life and will be worth less.  The Black-Scholes 
methodology does not account for these correlations.  This, in turn, implies that a proper stock 
option valuation – e.g., using a binomial tree approach – would incorporate these correlations. 
Finally, shorter CEO tenures, the greater sensitivity to stock performance, as well as 
higher CEO pay may have created a greater incentive for CEOs to engage in earnings 
management or manipulation.    22 
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Table 1:  Sample characteristics  
 
Selected firm characteristics for sample firms.  The sample includes Fortune 500 firms between 1992 and year-end 
2005.  Firm value equals the sum of the market value of equity, total long-term debt and the carrying value of 
preferred stock.  EBITDA/total assets is the ratio of EBITDA to average total book assets.  Annual stock return is 
the percentage change in the firm’s stock price at fiscal year-end.  Change in ROA equals the change in the ratio of 
the EBITDA to average total book assets.  Market-to-book equals the ratio of firm value to average total book assets.  
Sales growth is the percentage change in annual sales.  R&D/Sales is the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales.  
(Missing values of R&D are set equal to zero.)  The quick ratio is the ratio of cash, marketable securities and 
account receivables to total current liabilities.  The current ratio is the ratio of total current assets to total current 
liabilities.  The modified Z-score equals the sum of 3.3EBIT, sales, 1.4Retained earnings, and 1.2working capital 
divided by total assets.  The Kaplan-Zingales index is calculated following Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo (2001).  
Sample statistics are for firm averages.  
 
Variable  N  Mean  Median  Std. dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Size             
Total assets  1,014  18,998  3,919  56,757  155  722,905 
Sales  1,014  7,520  3,911  13,060  209  172,847 
Firm value  1,012  15,950  4,572  41,732  43  609,466 
Profitability             
EBITDA/total assets  1,005  0.1371  0.1311  0.0738  -0.0384  0.4900 
Annual stock return  1,011  0.0791  0.0693  0.1761  -0.7871  1.3913 
Change in ROA  997  -0.0132  -0.0087  0.0257  -0.2104  0.1391 
Growth Opportunities             
Market-to-book  1,012  1.2575  1.0133  0.8706  0.1157  5.8105 
Sales growth  1,009  0.1050  0.0755  0.1474  -0.4773  1.3666 
R&D/sales  1,018  0.0152  0.0000  0.0343  0.0000  0.2551 
Liquidity             
Quick ratio  1,009  0.4238  0.1880  0.7662  0.0017  5.3435 
Current ratio  1,009  1.9500  1.4944  2.0829  0.3359  15.4947 
Financial constraints     
Modified Z-score  1,011  1.8811  1.8118  1.1609  -0.3841  5.7507 
Kaplan-Zingales index  993  -2.6327  0.2001  8.3359  -52.0871  5.4286 
             
. 
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Table 2.  CEO Turnover 
 
CEO turnovers in publicly traded Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and year-end 2005.  Total turnover is all 
CEO turnover including turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange.  
Standard turnover excludes turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from a major stock exchange.  
Data are from annual Fortune 500 lists, 10-K filings, proxy statements, Dun and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar 
Directory and the Wall Street Journal.  Year denotes the fiscal year-end for the sales data on which Fortune ranks 
firms.  (i.e., 1992 corresponds to the 1993 April/May Fortune list.) 
 
    Total Turnover  Standard Turnover 
Year 
Number of 
firms  Number  Percent  Number  Percent 
1992  483  58  12.01%  57  11.80% 
1993  508  61  12.01  54  10.63 
1994  753  65  8.63  57  7.57 
1995  768  114  14.84  94  12.24 
1996  761  102  13.40  81  10.64 
1997  759  112  14.76  73  9.62 
1998  746  126  16.89  92  12.33 
1999  738  146  19.78  104  14.09 
2000  728  182  25.00  141  19.37 
2001  707  93  13.15  66  9.34 
2002  696  127  18.25  109  15.66 
2003  692  44  6.36  35  5.06 
2004  708  96  13.56  82  11.58 
2005  706  127  17.99  105  14.87 
           
Total  9,753  1,453  14.90%  1,150  11.79% 
1992-1997  4,032  512  12.70  416  10.32 
1998-2005  5,721  941  16.45  734  12.83 
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Table 3.  CEO turnover 
 
Number and percent of firms experiencing no turnover over a five-year period.  Turnover is measured using total 
turnover.  Total turnover is all CEO turnover including turnover due to mergers and acquisitions and delistings from 
a major stock exchange.   
 
Year  1992 
Number of firms  483 
  Number of firms experiencing no turnover between 1992 and 1997  169 
  Percent of firms experiencing no turnover between 1992 and 1997  34.99% 
   
Year  1998 
Number of firms  746 
  Number of firms experiencing no turnover between 1998 and 2003  180 
  Percent of firms experiencing no turnover between 1998 and 2003  24.13% 
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Table 4.  Probit regressions of the probability of internal CEO turnover on performance 
 
Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of internal CEO turnover during the period from 1992 to 2005.  The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and 
zero otherwise.  DProb measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables.  For indicator variables, the 
coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1.  Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity.  CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
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Number of obs  9,370  4,132  5,238  8,564  4,057  4,507 
Pseudo R
2  0.0746  0.0737  0.0764  0.0745  0.0744  0.0773 
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Table 5. Probit regressions of the probability of internal CEO turnover on performance and lagged performance 
 
Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of internal CEO turnover during the period from 1992 to 2005.  The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and 
zero otherwise.  DProb measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables.  For indicator variables, the 
coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1.  Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity.  CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
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Number of obs  9,216  4,046  5,170  8,378  3,949  4,429 
Pseudo R
2  0.0852  0.0845  0.0892  0.0858  0.0854  0.0926   30 
Table 6.  Probit regressions of relation of internal CEO turnover and performance for Fortune 500 firms in and not in the S&P 500 Index 
 
Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of internal CEO turnover for Fortune 500 firms during the period from 1992 to 2005.  Firms are divided into those in the S&P 
500 index and those not in the index.  The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and zero otherwise.  DProb measures the change in the probability of CEO 
turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables.  For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the 
indicator from 0 to 1.  Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity.  CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or 
equal to 60 and zero otherwise.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  p-values are in parentheses. 
  Full Sample  1992 - 1997  1998 - 2005 
  In S&P 500 
Index 
 
All other firms 
In S&P 500 
 Index 
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Number of obs  5,144  4,072  2,398  1,648  2,746  2,424 
Pseudo R
2  0.0979  0.0750  0.1129  0.0585  0.1014  0.0802   31 
Table 7.  Probit regressions of internal CEO turnover for Fortune 500 firms on performance and governance  
 
Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of internal CEO turnover for Fortune 500 firms during the period 1992 to 2005.  
The dependent variable equals one if the CEO turnovers and zero otherwise.  DProb measures the change in the probability of 
CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables.  For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the 
change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1.  Models are estimated with robust standard errors to 
control for heteroskedasticity.  CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  p-values are in parentheses. 
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Number of obs.  7,717  3,722  3,995 
Pseudo R
2  0.0934  0.0945  0.0998   32 
 
Table 8.  Multinominal logit regression estimates of the likelihood of no CEO turnover, unforced CEO turnover 
and forced CEO turnover for Fortune 500 firms. 
 
Multinominal logit regression estimates of the likelihood of no CEO turnover, non-forced CEO turnover and forced CEO 
turnover for Fortune 500 firms during the period 1992 to 2005..  DProb measures the change in the probability of the particular 
choice per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables.  For indicator variables, the coefficient represents the change in the 
probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1.  Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity.  CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  p-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 9.  Probit regressions of the probability of external CEO turnover on performance 
 
Probit regression estimates of the likelihood of external CEO turnover for Fortune 500 firms during the period 1992 to 2005. The dependent variable equals one if the CEO 
turnovers and zero otherwise.  DProb measures the change in the probability of CEO turnover per unit change in the relevant explanatory variables.  For indicator variables, 
the coefficient represents the change in the probability associated with moving the indicator from 0 to 1.  Models are estimated with robust standard errors to control for 
heteroskedasticity.  CEO age dummy equals 1 if lagged CEO age is greater than or equal to 60 and zero otherwise.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
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Number of obs  8,181  3,668  4,513  7,520  3,595  3,925 
Pseudo R
2  0.0169  0.0227  0.0224  0.0457  0.0496  0.0491 
 